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Abstract
Sweeney’s lament here was that words could not express the full complexity of his feelings and thoughts. The contested usage of
technical terms is also endemic in discussions of two of the most profound scientific mysteries: the mind/body problem and the
ultimate nature of physical reality. There are still scientific communities that deny the existence/importance of these (and any)
scientific mysteries; this will be discussed below. Henry Stapp’s research is exceptional in contemporary science in trying to
encompass and combine both mysteries.
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BBut I’ve gotta use words when I talk to you.^ Sweeney
in T.S. Eliot’s Sweeney Agonistes.
Historically, Democritus built a theory of perception ex-
plicitly based on his idea of atomic structure:
Democritus’ theory of perception depends on the claim
that eidôla or images, thin layers of atoms, are constant-
ly sloughed off from the surfaces of macroscopic bodies
and carried through the air… It is the impact of these on
our sense organs that enables us to perceive. (https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/democritus/)
This is probably the first enunciation of the mind/brain/
world problem that examines the relations between the phys-
ical world, our bodies (and brains), and the human mind of
first-person subjective experience. From a contemporary
view, human bodies and minds evolved to be adaptive in the
physical and social world, so the two mysteries are entangled.
It is fair to say that neither Henry Stapp nor anyone else has
solved either problem. His work has been extensively
discussed (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Stapp) and is
further reviewed in other articles in this Festschrift. What
might not be obvious is that exciting developments in many
fields have actually deepened both mysteries and any possible
interaction between them. Many suggested possibilities,
including the orthodox Copenhagen QM interpretation
(partially used by Stapp), have been seriously challenged.
Even fairly recently, it was feasible to suggest that unknown
circuits in the brain could embody solutions to the ancient
mind/body problems. However, the ongoing explosion of
knowledge of brain structure and function precludes any re-
ductionist explanation based on current neuroscience or any
proposed alternative (Parker and Newsome 1998; Feldman
2016).
The mysteries of the mind and of reality each have large
communities actively engaged in theory, experiment, and dis-
cussion. There are some efforts to cross-pollinate or combine
these efforts, but nothing deep has resulted. The core ques-
tions of the mind/body problem are never addressed in the
foundations of QM literature. A recent example is the won-
derful AdamBecker book BWhat is Real?^ (Becker 2018); the
index of the book contains no entry for brain, experience,
mind, observer, qualia, etc. The terms consciousness and ob-
servable do appear, but only as disembodied aspects of phys-
ical theory. Similarly, any invocation of Bquantum^ in the
mind/body literature is just a general claim that the extra com-
putational power of QM could (somehow) provide a basis for
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the richness of mind. None of the core questions concerning
physical reality are addressed. An informative exception is
Henry Stapp’s discussion of the binding problem (Feldman
2013), where visual features computed in distant brain regions
mysteriously give rise to a unified perception. From his dualist
stance, Stapp is able to postulate a mental solution to the
binding problem without concern for a specific neural sub-
strate (Stapp 2011).
Language and Mystery
It is certainly possible that advances on one of the core mys-
teries (the mind and physical reality) would shed light on the
other one and perhaps additional deep questions. However,
this article will focus on more general considerations about
how science can deal with phenomena that are currently
mysterious. Language and the definition and use of concepts
and words have a central role to play in all scientific discourse,
but especially in the exploration of the unknown. A more
extensive discussion of the importance of language for the
scientific study of mysteries can be found in (Feldman 2018).
A major linguistic source of confusion is the dichotomy
monism/dualism. This can lead to the assertion that either
our current scientific knowledge is adequate or we must in-
voke some non-material ontological forces. The following
quote from the distinguished clinician and neuroscientist
Michal Gazzaniga (Gazzaniga 2018) is typical:
Instead of an immaterial mind floating around with each
of us, modern science has moved the mind into the brain
and made it very physical. (Gazzaniga 2018)
This is a symptom of a forced choice between monism and
an immaterial dualism.
Science does not work that way; major scientific advances
come from novel concepts that are directly connected to
existing scientific ideas and experiments. The first step is to
clarify the scientific enterprise, which inherently involves sci-
entific realism. As is often the case, Rebecca Goldstein puts it
best, in her contribution to the book: What Scientific Term or
Concept Ought to beMoreWidely Known? (Goldstein 2017).
Scientific realism is the view that science expands upon—
and sometimes radically confutes—the view of the world that
we gain by means of our sense organs. Scientific theories,
according to this view, extend our grasp of reality beyond
what we can see and touch, pulling the curtain of our corporeal
limitations aside to reveal the existence of whole orders of
unobserved and perhaps unobservable things, hypothesized
in order to explain observations and having their reference
fixed by the laws governing their behavior. In order for theo-
ries to be true (or at any rate, approximations of the truth) these
things must actually exist. Scientific theories are ontologically
committed.
Scientific realism is not a claim of the reality of atoms, etc.,
but a methodological move to support experiment on postu-
lated entities that are not currently accessible. Of course, sci-
entific realism, like all of science, is approximate and subject
to revision. This entails the fact that hypothesized concepts
will sometimes be revealed as mistakes. Famous cases include
the ether, phlogiston, and vitalism. The contrasting view is
usually called instrumentalism, the position that science
should not postulate unobservable entities and restrict itself
to defining formalisms with explanatory and predictive power.
This is also known as Bshut up and calculate^ and is the dom-
inant ethos in physics and increasingly in other fields as part of
the Bbig data^ movement.
We can define a scientific mystery as a phenomenon for
which there is no plausible explanation. A related source of
mystery is an inconsistency between two or more conflicting
theories of the same phenomena. Much of the historical suc-
cess of science can be traced to concerted effort on mysteries.
Einstein believed a rather stronger statement.
The most beautiful and profound experience is the feel-
ing of mystery. It underlies religion as well as all deeper
aspirations in art and science. (Einstein)
It seems obvious that any effort on a scientific mystery
presupposes a commitment to scientific realism. One needs
to postulate unobservable entities in order to help explain the
mysterious phenomena. This simple linguistic observation
goes far to clear upmany (but not all) debates about both mind
and physical realism. Another linguistic problem arises from
the ubiquitous human tendency to extend (by analogy, meta-
phor, etc.) the meaning of words (Feldman 2005). Any at-
tempt to define a technical meaning for a word like Breality^
or Bconsciousness^ encounters semantic drift. This is the orig-
inal sin of academic philosophy. Scientific realism suggests
great care in choosing which unobservables to postulate and
how to name them.
A related problem is how to describe a general scientific
attitude when dealing with scientific mysteries—materialism,
etc., will certainly not do. We have seen that a required choice
between dualism and a forced monism choice of mind or
matter is also problematic. Henry Stapp has pursued the path
of explicit dualism, with limited success. There is a standard
philosophical stance named mysterianism (https://en.
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wikipedia.org/wiki/New_mysterianism), but this is usually
taken to suggest eternal mysteries. Given the great historical
success of scientific inquiry, we should assume that some, but
not necessarily all, of the current scientific mysteries can and
will be explained in this century. The stance that best
summarizes these constraints is agnostic mysterianism
(Feldman 2016; McGinn 2018).
Science as Demystification
One can view a core mission of science as attempting to
explain the mysteries of nature. The history of science is
largely a saga of increasingly sound theories of the mental,
physical, and social world. There is broad agreement that
the nature of the mind and of physical reality are two of the
deepest current mysteries, and one might hope that science
will help demystify either or both.
In fact, several ancient mysteries of the mind have been
largely reduced to routine science within our lifetime. One
interesting case is synesthesia, a perceptual experience in
which stimuli presented through one modality spontaneous-
ly evoke sensations in an unrelated modality. Themost com-
mon form, seeing/hearing numbers or letters as having spe-
cific colors, was well known to the Greeks. Many eminent
scientists studied this phenomenon including Goethe,
Locke, and Newton.
Synesthesia was considered a deep mystery well into the
twentieth century, and its demystification is not well known,
even today. Ongoing research from several perspectives
now forms the basis for a mature scientific discipline with
a literature (Ward 2013), professional societies, conferences
(Simner and Hubbard 2013), etc. One research branch
started from the observation of family correlations of spe-
cific kinds of synesthesia and has evolved into a rich
genome-based effort. An originally separate thread sug-
gested a universal Bneonatal synesthesia^ that is usually
pruned away through natural development. Brain imaging
(mostly fMRI) confirms appropriate synesthetic activity in,
e.g., color sensitive, brain regions of synesthetes. Current
work also includes studies of correlations between synes-
thesia and clinical conditions like autism and schizophrenia.
Conclusion
So far, this article has focused on issues involved in the
pursuit of scientific mysteries, but avoidance is at least as
common. In physics, this avoidance often manifests as in-
strumentalism, as discussed earlier. Themind/body problem
is much older and strikes much closer to our personal sense
of self. Many reductionist materialists (not only physicists)
manage to totally ignore the mind, first-person subjective
experience, and the other aspects of consciousness and
claim that QM explains everything (Carroll 2016).
In recent years, this faith-based reductionism has become
a mantra that defines seriousness in the cognitive and brain
sciences as Bthe mind is what the brain does^—no details
suggested. There is also a renewed interest in exploiting QM
as a key to understanding the mind. One recent book
(Gazzaniga 2018) follows Howard Pattee (Pattee 1982) in
assuming that the cut between quantum and classical reality
is exactly between living and non-living and that enzymes
act on both sides of the cut. A second new book (Georgiev
2017) is a much more technical presentation with postulated
QM axioms of mind and many detailed calculations and
examples. It also bottoms out in a form of panpsychism.
This brings me to a story of my favorite interaction with
Henry Stapp. After decades trying to build neural models
of subjective visual experience, I concluded that standard
theories of neural computation were inconsistent with
some famous mental mysteries, especially the binding
problem (Feldman 2013) and the experience of a rich sta-
ble visual world (Feldman 1985). A proof of this inconsis-
tency was published as BMysteries of Visual Experience^
(Feldman 2016). That article starts with an experiential
demonstration of stable world Billusion^. It then proves
that the basic facts about the structure and behavior of
the visual system according to the standard neural theory
of computat ion (Parker and Newsome 1998) are
inconsistent with the experience. It also shows that no
known alternative theory of brain computation can explain
such mysteries. Finally, it points out that such inconsis-
tencies have often led to major advances in physics, nota-
bly quantum mechanics.
The agnostic mysterianism formulation neither postulates
nor precludes Stapp’s ontologically distinct Bidea-like aspects
of nature.^ It does suggest that any proposed mind-brain the-
ory must confront the classical mind/body mysteries.
The response to these results has ranged from denial, to
avoidance, to Btrue, but not useful to my career^—except
for Edward Frenkel (www.edwardfrenkel.com/) and Henry
Stapp. When I presented these results in a UC Berkeley
seminar, Henry came up afterwards and expressed
approval and interest in the result, but that was not what
impressed me the most. He also suggested that perhaps we
could work on combining our ideas. My response was my
usual one—we need to start with how your theories would
deal with the standard mysteries discussed in my talk. His
answer was remarkably honest and humble—BOh, my
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theories can’t do that.^ Clearly, Henry is a gentleman of the
old school of serious scientists and it is a privilege to know
him.
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